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The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of institutional ownership and 
executive compensation on company performance in the food and beverage industry 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2014-2018. The variables used in this 
study are institutional ownership and executive compensation as independent variables, 
company performance (proxied by Tobin's Q, ROA, and ROE) as the dependent 
variable, as well as company size, leverage (proxied by DAR), and company age as the 
control variable. The sampling method used was the purposive sampling method, with 
the balanced panel data as a data analysis method. The results of this study indicate that 
institutional ownership has a significant positive effect on company performance (on 
Tobin's Q proxy) and insignificant (on ROA and ROE), while executive compensation 
does not have a significant effect on company performance. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Currently, the discussion about corporate governance is one of the topics that are quite 
widely researched. This is because the implementation of good corporate governance by 
a company can help ensure that the company continues to grow and develop in the long 
term. The implementation of good corporate governance can be the answer for companies 
to face economic challenges. 
The implementation of GCG in Indonesia is still not too massive but shows a pretty 
positive trend. Currently, good corporate governance has become an obligation for public 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). Along with developing the 
concept of good corporate governance, The Indonesian Institute for Corporate 
Governance (IICG) was formed as an independent institution that carries out 
dissemination and development of good corporate governance in Indonesia. They conduct 
research and ratings on implementing good corporate governance in companies, with a 
system known as the Corporate Governance Perception Index (CGPI) (Mirawati & 
Wulansari, 2018). 
Other than that, in the 2019 ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard (ACGS) 
assessment of listed companies with the largest market capitalization in each ASEAN 
country (Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam), there were ten 
issuers from Indonesia out of 100 companies in Southeast Asia that entered in the ASEAN 
Asset Class category. The number of  issuers has increased compared to 2015 and 2017 
(with two issuers and eight issuers respectively). This increase shows the progress of 
GCG in Indonesia towards a better direction. 
However, of all these issuers, no issuer comes from the Food and Beverages sector. This 
is very unfortunate because this sector can be considered as an industry that never dies. 
After all, it is the primary human need and cannot be replaced. Therefore, the 
implementation of GCG for companies in this sector must be improved to ensure that the 
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company continues to grow and develop in the long term and improve the company's 
performance. 
Company performance is one of the benchmarks in seeing the good or bad of a company. 
If the company is listed on the stock exchange, maximizing the company's performance 
is one of the main goals because high company performance can increase company value. 
The company's value reflects the company's performance in carrying out its operational 
activities since the company was founded now. Increasing the company's value is a goal 
that suits the owner of the company because with the increase in the value of the company, 
the welfare of the owner will increase. This will affect the company's attractiveness for 
investors to buy company shares because high company value will maximize share prices, 
thereby increasing welfare for shareholders or investors, and in the end, it will provide 
benefits for the company (Nugraha, 2018). 
A qualified GCG application can unite the interests of company management and the 
interests of shareholders in managing the company. Talking about shareholders, one form 
of corporate share ownership structure is institutional ownership. Institutional ownership 
is the ownership of company shares owned by institutions or institutions such as insurance 
companies, banks, investment companies, and other institutional ownership. Institutional 
ownership will encourage an increase in more optimal supervision of management 
performance (Fadillah, 2017). 
Several studies have looked at the effect of institutional ownership on company 
performance. Lin & Fu (2017) and Maharani & Utami (2019) state that institutional 
ownership has a significant positive effect on company performance because the greater 
the value of institutional ownership, the stronger the control over the company so that 
company owners can control management behaviour to act under company goals. Which 
in turn will improve company performance. However, these results contradict research 
conducted by Fadillah (2017) which states that institutional ownership has a significant 
negative effect on company performance and Amba (2014), which states that institutional 
ownership has no significant effect. 
Another factor that has an essential role in implementing GCG in a company is executive 
compensation. Agency conflict occurs when agents (board of commissioners and 
directors) use the information they have to make decisions that benefit themselves, 
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resulting in losses on the part of the principal (the party contracting the agent, the 
shareholders). Berger et al. (2013) stated that compensation is one of the tools that can be 
used to control corporate governance boards in reducing agency conflict. Therefore, in 
addition to compensation, it can be used to align the interests of shareholders with 
company executives, and it can also be used to motivate company executives to work 
better, which will impact improving company performance. 
Several studies have looked at the effect of executive compensation on company 
performance. Kagango (2016) and Abdalkrim (2019) state that executive compensation 
has a significant positive effect on company performance. It is explained that, by 
providing reasonable compensation, the executive will be triggered to try to improve the 
company's performance. This result contradicts the study of Matolcsy et al. (2012), which 
states that executive compensation has a significant negative effect on company 
performance and Bianchi & Chen's research (2015), which states that executive 
compensation has no significant effect on company performance. 
Based on the background and differences in the research results described above, the 
researcher is interested in conducting a study titled "The Effect of Institutional Ownership 
and Executive Compensation on Company Performance (Study on Food and Beverage 
Industry Listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange From 2014-2018)". In addition to the many 
different previous research results that cause research gaps, there are still not many studies 
that discuss the influence of GCG on company performance that specifically discusses 
companies in the food and beverage sector.  
With that being said, there are several objectives that the research is striving for:  
1. To determine the effect of institutional ownership on the performance of food 
and beverage companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 
2014-2018 
2. To determine the effect of executive compensation on the performance of food 
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LITERATURE REVIEW  
Company Performance 
The company as a form of organization has specific objectives to be achieved to fulfil the 
interests of the company's stakeholders. According to Fadillah (2017), company 
performance is a measuring tool that can be used to assess a company's success in 
achieving company goals. Then according to Rahmawati & Handayani (2017), company 
performance is a work achievement achieved by the company in a certain period which 
is the result of the work process that occurs in that period. Based on these explanations, 
it can be concluded that the company's performance is a description of the condition of a 
company as seen by specific measurement methods so that it can reflect the work 
performance of the company and the good and bad conditions of the company can be seen 
in a certain period. 
Institutional Ownership 
Institutional ownership is the ownership of company shares owned by other institutions 
or institutions such as insurance companies, banks, investment companies, and other 
companies. The existence of share ownership by institutional investors will encourage 
more optimal supervision of management performance (Fadillah, 2017). This was 
explained by Fazlzadeh et al. (2011), where the reason why institutional ownership is 
more capable of supervising is that they are believed to have the resources and ability to 
supervise management decision making adequately. Wulandari (2013) adds, the higher 
the institutional ownership, the stronger the external control on the company will be and 
can reduce agency costs experienced by the company. This is because, with solid external 
controls, management will be more careful in making decisions. 
Executive Compensation 
According to Anggraini et al. (2014), compensation can be considered remuneration 
related to the economic justice system for parties involved in organizing economic 
activities. Every employee, board, and management always pay attention to everything 
related to compensation. From the perspective of executive compensation, compensation 
is the reward they get as agents, where they have the responsibility to optimize the profits 
of the principals. In addition, they can also receive bonuses if they succeed in improving 
the company's performance. Kagango (2016) explains that the compensation received by 
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executives is determined based on company policy itself so that each company has 
different types of compensation. The most basic form of compensation is the basic salary 
received. In some companies, to align the interests of executives with shareholders, 
compensation can be given by share ownership, so that the compensation received 
depends on how well the company is performing. 
Company Size 
Company size describes how big or how small a company is as measured by various 
indicators, including the company's total assets, log size, and stock market value. In 
addition, company size can also be measured through total assets, total sales, average 
sales of assets, and average total assets of the company (Novari & Lestari, 2016). The 
larger the company's size, the greater the funds managed, so it can be ascertained that the 
company's management will become increasingly complex. 
Leverage 
Leverage is the company's ability to fulfil its financial obligations and can also be used 
to see how much the company is financed using debt (Novari & Lestari, 2016). Leverage 
is also used to measure how far borrowed funds finance the company. Leverage is divided 
into two types where operational leverage is the leverage that arises when the company 
uses assets that have fixed operating costs. At the same time, financial leverage is a source 
of funds or external sources of financing that the company uses to allocate assets or invest 
(Sari & Priyadi, 2016). 
Company Age 
The company's age is a description of how long a company has been in existence so that 
the company is still able to carry out its operational activities. By looking at the company's 
age, investors can conclude whether the company can continue to survive and be able to 
compete for business opportunities (Halim & Christiawan, 2019). With a good 
understanding of the industry, companies that have been established for a longer time 
tend to act more carefully in managing the company, resulting in more efficient 
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Research Hypotheses 
The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Company Performance 
Maharani & Utami (2019) state that institutional ownership has a significant positive 
effect on company performance. This is explained, the higher the institutional ownership 
that is owned, the stronger the control that the institution has over the company so that 
the institution that acts as the owner of the company can control management behaviour 
so that it acts under company goals which will ultimately improve company performance. 
In addition, Lin & Fu (2017) research explains that institutional ownership can actively 
oversee company business activities, minimize information gaps and agency problems, 
and help company performance in two ways. First, institutional investors can use their 
managerial abilities, professional knowledge, and voting rights to influence managers in 
improving corporate efficiency and corporate governance and assisting companies in 
making business decisions. Second, if the company requires costs to develop its business, 
institutional investors can help the company by providing funding or using its networks.  
The Effect of Executive Compensation on Company Performance 
Kagango (2016) states that executive compensation has a significant positive effect on 
company performance. This is explained, if the executives have a strong interest, then the 
impact they can cause from the decisions they make for the company will also be more 
substantial. Thus, companies can improve their performance if the interests held by the 
executive can be fulfilled by compensation. In addition, the interests of shareholders and 
the executive can be aligned with the level of compensation received by the executive. If 
the compensation received is equal, the compensation will be an incentive for the 
executive to improve company performance. 
In addition, Abdalkrim (2019) states that the compensation received by executives will 
be a trigger for them to improve company performance. In addition, the costs incurred to 
pay executive compensation can be considered an investment for the company because 
the leadership abilities possessed by executives can be a guarantee to improve company 
performance. 
68 




Figure 1. Research Model 
 
RESEARCH METHOD  
This research uses descriptive and associative research methods. The descriptive research 
method is a research method to describe the phenomena that occur at this time or in the 
past. The associative research method aims to identify and explain the causal relationship 
between one variable and another. The analysis technique used in this research is 
quantitative analysis because the data used is in the form of numbers with the panel data 
regression method as a data analysis method. 
The objects in this study are institutional ownership, executive compensation, and 
company performance. The subjects of this research are food and beverage sub -sector 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the 2014-2018 period. The data 
used is secondary data obtained from financial reports and company annual reports. 
Sampling in this study using the purposive sampling method, namely sampling, is carried 
out based on a particular consideration that the researcher has determined. The criteria 
used to determine the sample to be taken (1) Companies that have been listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2014 (the first year of the research period), (2) Companies 
that provide annual reports or financial reports for five consecutive years (2014-2018), 
and (3) Companies that include data required for research in their annual/financial reports. 
The population used in this study were all companies in the Food and Beverage subsector 
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2020, totalling 33 companies. Through the 
purposive sampling technique, the researcher obtained a sample of 16 companies with a 
research period of five years, so that there were 80 observational data.  
69 
JDMB Vol. 04 No. 1 2021 
 
In this study, there are three different types of variables used the dependent variable that 
will be used is company performance and uses Tobin's Q, ROA (Return on Asset), and 
ROE (Return on Equity) as proxies. Then the independent variables used in this study are 
institutional ownership and executive compensation. Finally, the control variables used 
are company size, leverage (as proxied by Debt to Asset Ratio [DAR]), and company age.  
In this study, the regression equation model used is divided into using control variables 
and not using control variables. Each model will be tested three times differently, using 
the three proxies of company performance, namely Tobin's Q, ROA, and ROE, so that a 
total of six regressions is carried out. These models have the following equation: 
(a) FIRP = β0 + β1INSTit + β2COMPit + ɛit 
(1) Tobin’s Q = β0 + β1INSTit + β2COMPit + ɛit 
(2) ROA = β0 + β1INSTit + β2COMPit + ɛit 
(3) ROE = β0 + β1INSTit + β2COMPit + ɛit 
(b) FIRP = β0 + β1INSTit + β2COMPit + β3SIZEit + β4DARit + β5AGEit + ɛit 
(4 ) Tobin’s Q = β0 + β1INSTit + β2COMPit + β3SIZEit + β4DARit + β5AGEit + ɛit 
(5 ) ROA = β0 + β1INSTit + β2COMPit + β3SIZEit + β4DARit + β5AGEit + ɛit 
(6 ) ROE = β0 + β1INSTit + β2ECOMit + β3SIZEit + β4DARit + β5AGEit + ɛit 
Explanation: 
FIRP = Firm/Company Performance 
INST = Institutional Ownership 
COMP = Executive Compensation 
SIZE = Company Size 
DAR = Debt to Asset Ratio 
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RESULT AND DISCUSSION  
Normality Test 
The normality test is carried out to determine whether the residual value in the regression 
model is normally distributed or not. This test is carried out with the Jarque-Bera test, if 
the probability value of the Jarque-Bera is more significant than 0.05, the residual is 
usually distributed. However, if the probability value of Jarque-Bera is smaller than 0.05, 
the residuals are not normally distributed. However, after the researcher processed the 
data, the researcher found problems in the normality test caused by the residual data not 
generally distributed in all research models. To overcome this, the researcher conducted 
an outlier test. This is intended to eliminate data with extreme values in observations to 
be no normality problem in the residual data.  
Table 1. Normality Test Results (Before Outlier Test) 
 
Model Jarque-Bera Probability Result 
Model 1 365.8517 0,0000 Not Normal 
Model 2 115.7334 0,0000 Not Normal 
Model 3 370.0002 0,0000 Not Normal 
Model 4 286.6317 0,0000 Not Normal 
Model 5 145.8425 0,0000 Not Normal 
Model 6 727.7407 0,0000 Not Normal 
 
Table 2. Normality Test Results (After Outlier Test) 
 
Model Jarque-Bera Probability Result 
Model 1 4.0996 0,1288 Normal 
Model 2 1.9646 0,3744 Normal 
Model 3 1.2484 0,5357 Normal 
Model 4 1.9359 0,3799 Normal 
Model 5 43.1318 0,0000 Not Normal 
Model 6 27.1194 0,0000 Not Normal 
 
After the outlier test, all models have passed the normality test, except for model 5 and 
model 6. However, to avoid eliminating a lot of research data, causing too little research 
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Multicollinearity Test 
The multicollinearity test aims to see whether the regression model finds a correlation or 
relationship between the independent variables. If there is no correlation or relationship 
between the independent variables, it can be said that the regression model is good. If 
there is a correlation coefficient between variables of more than 0.9, then the independent 
variable experiences multicollinearity. For this study, the control variables will also be 
included in the multicollinearity test. 
Table 3. Multicollinearity Test Results 
 
 INST COMP Size DAR Age 
INST 1.0000 -0.3095 -0.5460 0.1308 -0.0243 
COMP -0.3095 1.0000 0.8454 0.0840 -0.5497 
Size -0.5460 0.8454 1.0000 -0.1349 -0.5056 
DAR 0.1307 0.0840 -0.1349 1.0000 -0.0417 
Age -0.0243 -0.5497 -0.5056 -0.0417 1,0000 
 
From the results of the multicollinearity test, there is no correlation coefficient between 
variables that is more than 0.9. So it can be said that there is no correlation between the 
independent variables used in this study.  
Data Panel Regression 

















11.3962 -0.0536 0.8272 30.2682 1.2006 2.3500 
0.0327 0.8976 0.2933 0.0020 0.1217 0.0920 
INST 
3.5171 0.0886 0.1398 3.7635 0.1128 0.2326 
0.0056** 0.3641 0.4448 0.0020*** 0.2411 0.1788 
COMP 
-0.5059 0.0028 -0.0341 -0.1386 0.0302 0.0533 
0.0271** 0.8743 0.3118 0.6293 0.2102 0.2169 
SIZE 
- - - -1.0634 -0.0703 -0.1349 
- - - 0.0020*** 0.0122** 0.0077*** 
DAR 
- - - 0.7003 0.0144 0.1997 
- - - 0.4355 0.8464 0.1402 
AGE 
- - - -0.0859 0.0036 0.0057 
- - - 0.1661 0.4811 0.5335 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.8876 0.5355 0.3374 0.9072 0.5877 0.4633 
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0.0000 0.0000 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 
Observation 55 55 55 55 55 55 
Based on the results of panel data regression, it can be seen that institutional ownership 
has a significant positive effect on company performance through the proxy of Tobin's Q, 
with a probability value below 0.05 (0.0056 for model 1 and 0.0020 for model 4). 
Following research from Lin & Fu (2017) which also measures company performance 
through Tobin's Q proxy, they explain that institutional ownership can actively monitor 
business activities carried out by companies, minimize information gaps and agency 
problems, and help company performance by providing the resources they have to 
improve it, so that the existence of institutional ownership has a high influence, at least in 
a market-based manner. 
However, institutional ownership has an insignificant positive effect on company  
performance through the proxies of ROA and ROE, were all probability values in Models 
2, 3, 5, and 6 are above 0.05. Research from Amba (2014) explains that institutions that 
own shares in a company tend to be passive and are more interested in increasing profits 
for themselves and expanding their portfolios only, so even though the owner institution 
will help the company improve their performance, the influence they provide will not be 
significant from an accounting-based perspective. 
Then in model 1, executive compensation has a significant effect on company 
performance as measured by Tobin's Q, with the resulting probability value being below 
0.05. However, in other models, executive compensation has an insignificant effect on 
company performance, wherein in these models (including model 4, which also measures 
company performance with Tobin's Q), the resulting probability value is above 0.05. With 
these results, the researcher concludes that executive compensation does not significantly 
affect firm performance. Following research from Bianchi & Chen (2015), they state that 
there is a possibility that better company performance is the result of the executive's luck 
in running the company in the first period, and he will be given an increase in 
compensation in the second period. However, because the company's performance is 
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irrelevant to the capabilities and behaviour of the executive, the company's performance 
may fall to the mean (average) performance in the next period, so that the compensation 
that the company has given to the executive is useless and insignificant.  
Adjusted R2 Test 
This test is used to see how much the independent variable affects the dependent variable. 
The coefficient of determination close to one means that the independent variables almost 
provide all the information needed to predict the dependent variable.  

















0,8876 0,5355 0,3374 0,9072 0,5877 0,4633 
 
Of all the research models tested, based on the adjusted R-squared value, the fittest model 
is model 4 because it has the highest adjusted R-squared value, namely 0.9072 (90.72%). 
This model can be formulated into: 
Tobin's Q = 30.2682 + 3.7635 INST - 0.13886 COMP - 1.0634 SIZE + 0.7003 
DAR - 0.0859 AGE 
The result indicates that all the independent variables used in Model 4 can predict changes 
in the dependent variable by 90.72%. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Companies, so that the existence of institutional ownership has a significant influence, at 
least in a market-based manner. Institutional ownership has a significant positive effect 
on company performance in Tobin's Q proxy. This is because institutional ownership can 
actively oversee business activities carried out by the company, minimize information 
gaps and agency problems, and help company performance by providing the resources it 
has to improve performance. 
Accounting-based. However, institutional ownership does not affect company 
performance through the proxies of ROA and ROE. This is because institutions that own 
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shares in a company tend to be passive and are more interested in increasing profits and 
expanding their portfolios only. Even though the institutional owners will help companies 
improve their performance, their influence is not very significant in their perspective. 
Then, executive compensation does not affect company performance. This is because the 
possibility of better company performance is the result of the executive's luck in running 
the company in the first period, and he will be given an increase in compensation in the 
second period. However, because the company's performance is irrelevant to the 
capabilities and behaviour of the executive, the company's performance may fall to the 
mean (average) performance in the next period, so that the compensation tha t the 
company has given to the executive is useless and insignificant. 
This research is expected to be a scientific and informative consideration, especially for 
companies, especially food and beverage companies, in making the right policies in 
maximizing the role and benefits of institutional ownership so that their existence can 
maximize company performance not only market-based but also on an accounting-based 
basis. In addition, the company must also provide appropriate compensation to executives 
to ensure that the compensation provided can provide good results for the company. 
In addition, this research is expected to be an informative consideration for investors 
when choosing companies, especially food and beverage companies, to invest in. 
Investors can make decisions based on institutional ownership and executive 
compensation in the company. This will indirectly have an impact on other company 
policies that can influence investors in investing. 
Then, several recommendations can be implemented by further research that has similar 
subjects to this study: 
1. Further research can add variables that consider other factors within the company, 
such as other Good Corporate Governance variables, and use financial ratios that 
can see the company's performance more technically so that the results obtained 
are more varied. 
2. Expanding the object of research, not only researching food and beverage 
companies but also companies operating in other industries, the research results 
are more varied. 
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